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Introduction 
 
 
Islamist and Secular Forces in Morocco 
Not a Zero-Sum Game 
Mohammed Masbah 
In Morocco, unlike in other Arab countries, Islamists and seculars tend to cooperate 
in formal as well as informal politics. Political opportunities and pragmatic interests 
trump ideology most of the time, providing a suitable environment for a broadly in-
clusive political order. However, two factors stand in the way of sustained cooperation 
between Islamist and secular currents: on the one hand, sporadic upsurges of identity 
politics, and on the other, the strategies of divide and rule traditionally pursued by the 
“Makhzen” and its close allies. Rather than focusing on a set of partners who appear at 
first to be compatible with their values, Europeans should promote an inclusive politi-
cal process that integrates all actors with significant popular outreach, such as the social 
movement Jama’at Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and Charity Association, AWI). 
 
Political divisions in Morocco are typically 
driven by tactical choices and specific issues, 
and much less by ideology. To give but one 
example: In late October 2014, a coalition 
of labor unions, secular opposition parties, 
and the Islamist social movement AWI 
joined ranks in calling for a general strike 
against austerity measures adopted by 
the government, which likewise comprises 
secular and Islamist parties. For his part, 
Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane of the 
governing moderate Islamist Justice and 
Development Party (Parti de la justice et 
du développement, PJD) rejected attempts 
to single out his party as the target of the 
strike. Rather, he emphasized the cohesive-
ness and harmony of the governing coa-
lition across ideological differences, a 
coalition that comprises – in addition to 
the PJD – three other secular parties: (1) the 
Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), which 
originated in the communist party and had 
a long history of ideological animosity with 
the PJD; (2) the Popular Movement (MP), a 
non-ideological pro-palace party; and (3) the 
secular pro-palace party National Rally of In-
dependents (Rassemblement National des 
Indépendants, RNI). 
Islamists and Seculars – 
Who Are They? 
In Morocco, as in the rest of the Arab world, 
the terms “Islamists” and “seculars” may 
refer to a wide range of actors. So-called 
Islamists are typically actors whose political 
and social platforms are based on specific 
readings of Islamic principles. This category 
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encompasses moderate Islamic parties 
striving to participate in democratic pro-
cesses – such as the Justice and Develop-
ment Party in Turkey, Ennahda in Tunisia, 
or the PJD in Morocco – and reaches to 
radical and militant formations, such as 
Salafi-Jihadis and al-Qaida affiliates, who 
reject democracy as such on ideological 
grounds. 
In Morocco, the largest organizations 
with Islamist orientation are the moderate 
– but not legalized – social movement AWI 
and the moderate Islamist party PJD, along-
side a range of Salafi groups of different 
orientations. 
AWI is a social movement with a rigid 
hierarchical structure. Since its founding in 
1987, it has chosen not to engage in formal 
politics. It is not opposed to formal political 
participation per se, but its founder, Abdes-
salam Yassine (who died in 2012), opted 
against participation due to his opposition 
to the monarchy in its actual form, which 
he described as a “compulsory authority.” 
Yassine was inspired by both Sufi spiritual 
teachings and the Iranian revolution. This 
is why AWI has been moderate at the ideo-
logical level but radical at the political level. 
Sufi spirituality provides AWI’s followers 
with qualities of discipline and patience. 
At the same time, AWI has succeeded in 
building a strong apparatus aiming to be 
the vanguard of the “critical masses” that 
would march peacefully to effect radical 
change. 
Organizational strength and ideological 
indoctrination have provided the move-
ment with strength against the regime’s 
sporadic “soft” repression. The latter has 
aimed at weakening the organization by, 
for example, shutting down its offices at 
the local level, but has not attempted to 
completely ban its activities and structures. 
The PJD, by contrast, is a political party 
that shares some ideological affinity with 
the Muslim Brotherhood. The PJD stands 
for a genuine strategic alliance with the 
monarchy, as it believes that reform is pos-
sible through formal political participation 
and non-contentious politics. To achieve 
this goal, it focuses on gradualism and co-
operation with all relevant political actors. 
Thus, the main political difference between 
the PJD and AWI is the former’s pragma-
tism. 
Seculars, on the other hand, are general-
ly defined in opposition to Islamists, as Islam 
is not the main ideological driving force 
behind their political activities. They are 
not opposed to local Islamic culture and 
values – for this reason, we call them secu-
lars and not secularists – and may, at the 
same time, have their own interpretations 
of Islam, which they conceive of as being 
distinct from the approaches of trans-
national political Islam advocated by organi-
zations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Similar to other Arab countries, until 
recently most Moroccan seculars would not 
have described themselves as such, not least 
to avoid the negative connotation of the 
term among the wider population, which 
tends to conflate it with atheistic or anti-
religious tendencies. Recently, however, 
there has been a trend to adopt “secular” 
as a self-designation among intellectuals 
who wish to take a clear position against 
the advances of Islamists in the political 
mainstream. 
Historically, Moroccan seculars were 
identified with the political left, although 
many veered toward liberalism after the 
collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe 
in the early 1990s. Liberals, on the other 
hand, had been sponsored by the monarchy 
since the 1960s to serve as a counterweight 
to the left. However, they are firmly “liberal” 
only on economic issues, such as protection 
of property rights and private enterprise, 
whereas their commitments to civil liber-
ties and democracy find limits in their 
deference to the palace. 
In general, during the 2011 protest move-
ment, the constitutional reform process, and 
the workings of the current governmental 
coalition, Islamist-secular cooperation and 
contention have been determined much 
less by ideology than by concrete interests. 
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The 2011 Protest Movement 
During the protests in 2011, Islamists were 
found on both sides. Ideology was of sec-
ondary importance; what mattered instead 
was the position vis-à-vis the ruling regime 
– the monarchy and its entourage in the 
state administration and the business com-
munity, locally referred to as the “Makhzen.” 
The decisions about whether or not to sup-
port the protest movement were based on 
political calculations, and more specifically 
the balance between the moderates and 
radicals in both camps. 
This became clear in the responses to the 
regime’s initiatives to absorb popular anger 
in 2011. Both AWI and the radical left, led 
by the An-Nahj ad-Dimuqrati (Democratic 
Path, Nahj) party, rejected the king’s speech 
of March 9, 2011, describing his call for 
“deep political reforms” as a “trick” to give 
the regime a new lease of life. Thus, the 
palace’s top-down reform approach unified 
the radical opposition and led to an im-
plicit agreement between AWI and the 
radical left to cooperate under the banner 
of what was to become known as the Feb-
ruary 20 Movement (Mouvement 20 Février, 
M20F). Both AWI and Nahj are pursuing a 
maximalist approach and seeking radical 
reform that would give “people the right to 
choose” the political system of the country 
through a constitutional assembly, includ-
ing the option to abolish the monarchy 
through a democratic vote. They believe 
that only radical regime change can im-
prove the current situation, be it through 
the voluntary abdication of the king and a 
transfer of his authority to an elected con-
stitutional assembly, or through popular 
uprisings and campaigns for civil disobedi-
ence. 
Consequently, in March 2011 members 
of both groups refused to support a petition 
for political reform, including a transition 
toward constitutional monarchy. The peti-
tion had been signed by 166 Moroccan 
intellectuals and politicians – four of them 
members of the PJD who later became 
ministers – under the title “the change we 
want.” AWI and Nahj declined to sign the 
petition that, according to them, put a 
ceiling on the “aspirations of the people.” 
For AWI, the M20F provided an oppor-
tunity to acquire a greater presence in the 
public sphere after a period of hibernation 
that started in 2007, in which the authori-
ties suppressed most of its activities, and 
thus its visibility decreased. For this reason, 
AWI joined the protest movement at an 
early stage to advance its claims and griev-
ances. Due to its long history and numeri-
cal strength, it provided the movement 
with an organizational backbone and social 
resonance. 
At the tactical level, AWI agreed to grant 
a greater share of representation to com-
paratively small secular parties in the move-
ment’s organizational structure, meaning 
that AWI’s share of representatives in M20F’s 
national support bureau – and hence its 
visibility in the media – remained far below 
its share in the movement itself. Instead, 
young secular activists attracted much of 
the attention. These tactical moves were 
adopted to avoid regime repression and to 
build confidence with secular actors, there-
by allowing AWI to be perceived as coopera-
tive rather than hegemonic. However, AWI 
had a strong presence at the local level, and 
its members were very active in the local 
committees of the movement. 
Although the M20F provided an oppor-
tunity for a rapprochement between Islam-
ist and secular forces, it also demonstrated 
the limits of alliances between ideological 
rivals. For AWI, participation in the M20F 
did not come without concessions. It was 
obliged to accept the secular nature of 
the movement, and hence it had to avoid 
religious slogans. This was a contentious 
point in summer 2011, as secular activists 
refused any kind of religious rhetoric and 
sometimes showed little respect for reli-
gious participants. For instance, during 
Ramadan, protests often started during 
evening prayers, which are of special im-
portance for observant Muslims. For some 
members of AWI, such a lack of considera-
tion amounted to deliberate slights, which 
contributed to the ultimate dissolution of 
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the cooperation with secular forces by 
December 2011. 
Yet, the main motivation for AWI to 
eventually leave the movement was politi-
cal. An evaluation by its leadership of the 
actual political benefits reaped from its 
participation in the M20F led AWI to the 
conclusion that it had, in fact, facilitated 
the victory of the PJD in the November 
2011 elections, without getting anything 
in return. In terms of costs and benefits, 
AWI thus found itself with a non-produc-
tive investment. Its position vis-à-vis the 
regime was not strengthened, nor did it 
gain acceptance in the secular milieu. 
AWI thus expressed its frustration with its 
secular allies and accused them of being 
exclusive. Another reason for AWI’s with-
drawal was the fear of harsh repression 
from the regime, or – as a leader of the 
movement put it in July 2014 – that “con-
tinuing the protests in the street [in 2011] 
would have meant confrontation” with the 
regime. 
To date, attempts to reactivate the co-
operation have been unsuccessful. Thus, 
since December 2011, M20F has been an 
empty shell. On its part, since that time, 
AWI has kept a low profile and been wait-
ing for an opportunity to become engaged 
again. But at the same time, it seems that 
its leaders have adapted their discourse 
somewhat and begun assuming a more 
conciliatory tone toward other political 
and social actors. This might be due to 
what happened in Egypt, where the Muslim 
Brotherhood isolated itself from other forces 
and thus became an easy target for the 
crackdown by the regime. In any case, AWI 
clearly showed its fascination with the 
Tunisian approach of cooperation between 
Islamists and seculars. Still, it is hard to 
predict how AWI would behave with regard 
to cooperation if it participated in politics. 
Constitutional Reform 
The constitutional amendment process 
initiated by the monarchy in 2011 likewise 
revealed shortcomings in the rapproche-
ment between Islamists and seculars in 
Morocco and again confirmed the split 
between moderates and radicals within 
both camps noted earlier. 
For the radical opposition, both AWI 
and Nahj categorically rejected the process 
of constitutional amendments initiated by 
the palace and boycotted the whole process, 
i.e., participation in public discussions, 
meetings with the drafting committee, and 
the referendum on the constitution. They 
saw the constitutional process as being com-
pletely dominated by the palace, with the 
king delineating the narrow confines of 
amendments, appointing the committee 
members charged with writing the new con-
stitution, and marginalizing the parliament 
and government in the process. It was thus 
considered nothing more than a renewal 
of allegiance to the monarchy. AWI labeled 
the drafting process for the new constitu-
tion a “comedy,” as it granted the king “ab-
solute power” and lacked a response to “the 
minimum of expectations of the people.” 
Instead of a committee appointed by the 
king, it called for a democratic constitution 
drafted by an elected constituent assembly. 
Nahj reiterated AWI’s arguments and de-
scribed the constitution as a “limited con-
cession to absorb popular anger and abort 
M20F.” Yet, in contrast to AWI, Nahj pub-
lished a memorandum advocating for a 
constitution that contains provisions for a 
“secular and democratic state that guar-
antees freedoms of belief, and prohibits the 
utilization of religion for political ends.” 
Although the drafting of the new consti-
tution was indeed controlled by the palace, 
ideological clashes still erupted between 
those involved in the process. During the 
public debates over the new constitution 
between March and mid-June 2011, Islamist 
and secular actors fought over issues of iden-
tity and the nature of the state. Ironically, 
all parties represented in parliament – secu-
lars and Islamists alike – called to preserve a 
stipulation that asserts the religious author-
ity of the king as “commander of the faith-
ful” and to keep the ministry of endow-
ments and religious affairs under the con-
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trol of the monarchy. In this, both sides 
used mirror-images of each other’s reason-
ing: Islamists came out for the religious 
authority of the king to prevent Morocco 
from becoming a secular state that pays 
little respect to Islam, whereas seculars saw 
the monarchy’s tolerant version of Islam 
as a guarantee against a radical transfor-
mation of Morocco into a theocratic state, 
even if Islamists were to attain power. 
Yet, conflicts surfaced over questions 
related to individual liberties and the 
role of religion in politics. The PJD and its 
support base in civil society pushed for 
strengthening Islamic references in the 
new constitution and for a guarantee that 
legislation would not violate the provisions 
of Islam. In mid-June 2011, the PJD even 
hinted that it might abstain from voting 
on the new constitution in case it con-
tained provisions against Islam. By contrast, 
secular parties represented in the parlia-
ment expressed their support for individual 
liberties, such as access to abortion or the 
principle that sexual orientation as well as 
religious beliefs and practices – including 
fasting during Ramadan – should be con-
sidered private matters that are of no 
concern to the state. They also argued for 
international treaties to take precedence 
over national laws, including issues that, 
according to Moroccan law, fall under the 
jurisdiction of Islamic Sharia law, such as 
inheritance and family law. 
In contrast to their enthusiasm for indi-
vidual liberties, secular parties turned out 
to be far more conservative when it came to 
preserving the king’s religious and political 
prerogatives, which they perceive as a guar-
antee to hedge against possible electoral 
advances by the Islamists. For instance, 
whereas the PJD proposed that the execu-
tive powers of the ministerial council (which 
makes strategic decisions and is headed 
by the king) should be transferred to the 
government council (which is headed by 
the elected head of government, i.e., the 
prime minister), the Socialist Union of 
Popular Forces (USFP) opted to preserve the 
former body’s prerogatives. 
Indeed, some members of the constitu-
tional committee with a secular background 
expressed their misgivings when several 
secular and leftist parties and members of 
the committee called to award “absolute 
powers” to the monarchy, which was inter-
preted as an indication of their lack of trust 
in political parties and the wider popula-
tion. Such antagonism likely stems from 
fear of an Islamist tide. Major secular parties 
prefer an executive monarchy and an 
authoritarian regime to an elected Islamist 
government. This also explains why the 
secular left, in 1997 and 2002, accepted to 
become part of a weak coalition govern-
ment without any real power or guarantees 
of a democratic transition. To substitute 
for the lack of a strong social base, they 
have preferred instead to align with the 
monarchy and promote themselves as a 
safe alternative to Islamists. The ultimate 
nightmare for seculars would be a con-
servative coalition between the monarchy 
and Islamists that leaves them marginal-
ized. Yet, their adopted elitist positions 
have only succeeded in alienating them 
even more from the wider population. 
Government Coalition 
Moroccan Islamists have displayed readi-
ness for pragmatic concessions. After its 
success in the November 2011 parliamen-
tary elections, the PJD established a govern-
ment coalition with three secular parties: 
the conservative Istiqlal Party (PI), the PPS, 
and the MP. The USFP declined an invita-
tion to join the government as a result of 
internal conflicts over the modest results it 
achieved in the elections and the question 
of whether participation would weaken or 
strengthen the party. In October 2012, the 
secular pro-palace party RNI joined the 
coalition to substitute for the PI, which had 
withdrawn half a year earlier (for details, 
see Mohammed Masbah, Morocco’s Slow Motion 
Reform Process, January 2014, SWP Com-
ments 6/2014). 
Since the PJD has no majority of its own, 
and since no other Islamist parties are rep-
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resented in parliament, the PJD has had no 
other option but to partner with secular 
parties. In the process, it has learned that it 
has to avoid ideological struggles if it wants 
to keep the government coalition coherent. 
Since taking over the government in early 
2012, it has moved in the direction of 
moderation and pragmatism. Significantly, 
during its seventh national party conference 
in July 2012, “freedom of belief” was includ-
ed in the program. The program also argues 
for a functional relationship between reli-
gion and politics, whereby religion should 
function as a set of guiding principles 
and values, without “sacralizing” human 
activity. The PJD has also made remarkable 
progress on issues of individual liberties, 
indicated by its endorsement of a United 
Nations resolution on religious freedoms 
in March 2014. 
As a result of this ideological adaptation, 
the PJD has been successful in avoiding ideo-
logical conflicts with its secular coalition 
partners and has been able to focus mainly 
on socioeconomic issues. Even when it 
comes to issues related to ideology, the PJD 
and its ideological ally, the NGO al-Tawhid 
wa-l-Islah (Unity and Reform Movement), 
have shown much greater flexibility than 
in the past. For example, while still in 
opposition, the PJD had been critical of the 
“corrupting” influence of state-sponsored 
music festivals, in particular the annual 
MAWAZINE event in Rabat, which is offi-
cially under the patronage of the king, 
and the association organizing the event 
is headed by his personal secretary. Since 
assuming power, such displays of concern 
for public morals have largely ceased. 
The void thus left by the PJD has in-
creasingly been filled by Salafis, who have 
achieved more visibility on questions of 
identity and values. For instance, Salafi 
sheikhs publicly condemned demands to 
secularize the inheritance law – which, in 
Morocco, as in most predominantly Muslim 
countries, is regulated by Sharia law – and 
calls by secular intellectuals to reform reli-
gious education in primary schools, con-
sidering such calls a “war against Islam.” 
One little-known Salafi even accused the 
authors of apostasy, amounting to an im-
plicit call for violence against them. The 
PJD, for its part, kept calm and blamed 
both sides for creating useless tensions. 
Islamists’ Pragmatism 
To understand Islamists’ pragmatism, one 
has to look at the cost-benefit calculations 
they follow and the actual options they 
possess. Moderate Islamists feel rooted in 
Moroccan society; they are active in pro-
viding social services to the unprivileged 
through a large network of NGOs that simi-
larly share a religiously inflected identity; 
they are active in mosques; and their mes-
sages resonate among young urban middle 
classes. Moreover, the flexible nature of the 
“enlightened” or “competitive” authoritar-
ianism applied by the Moroccan regime 
has given political actors some room for 
maneuver. Islamists have benefited from 
this margin and turned it into political 
opportunities, using the resources men-
tioned above to mobilize the population, 
predominantly around social grievances. 
At the same time, the threat of repres-
sion and pressure from the regime has also 
forced them to make concessions and dis-
play pragmatism. For instance, in the after-
math of the Egyptian coup in July 2013, 
the PJD voluntarily handed over several key 
ministerial positions to pro-palace parties 
or technocrats. Similarly, AWI did not push 
for an escalation on the streets, so as to 
avoid a violent reaction from the regime 
against the backdrop of repression against 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 
In addition, the PJD and its allies have 
built well-organized structures with a com-
paratively young leadership – especially 
when measured against secular parties – 
and a culture of internal transparency and 
dialogue, which allows them to compete 
with seculars on their own turf, e.g., with 
regard to internal democracy, freedom of 
expression, and the role of women. PJD 
leaders are clearly practicing a more demo-
cratic and transparent style of leadership, 
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its youth section has more freedom to criti-
cize the leadership, and women are more 
visible in party organs, including the upper 
echelon, than with most of their secular 
competitors. For example, the PJD has the 
highest percentage of women among its 
members of parliament of all the parties 
represented in parliament. Also, the NGO 
Unity and Reform Movement recently elect-
ed a woman as vice-president, the highest 
position a woman has ever reached within 
an Islamic movement. 
Divisive Rule 
Alliances between secular and Islamist 
political forces have been marred by a long 
history of mutual animosity and mistrust, 
and by disagreements between moderates 
and radicals within each camp about the 
merits of such strategies. But they have also 
faltered as a result of the divisive rule prac-
ticed by the regime. The palace has a long 
tradition of applying strategies of divide 
and rule and of exploiting existing animos-
ities to nurture the division between Islam-
ists and seculars. Playing actors off one 
another is one of the palace’s traditional 
strategies to retain power. 
Before the 2011 protests, the regime used 
to create and prop up secular parties to con-
front the Islamists. This was obvious in the 
case of the Authenticity and Modernity Party 
(PAM), which was established in 2008 by a 
close adviser of the king as a result of a tacit 
agreement between circles within the palace 
and the secular far left, which constituted 
the backbone of the new party. Ideological-
ly disposed against the Islamists, they were 
more than ready to confront the PJD and 
received positions in state institutions and 
the parliament in return. Since the creation 
of PAM, ideological quarrels between the 
two parties (then both in the opposition) 
have been a constant, mainly over issues of 
individual liberties and the role of religion 
in public life. 
In October 2011, a few weeks before the 
elections, PAM initiated a collaboration 
with seven other secular parties under the 
name “Alliance for Democracy” (also known 
as G8) to create a broad front against the 
PJD. In this fashion, the palace hoped to hit 
two birds with one stone: to deliver on the 
promise to allow electoral fairness and trans-
parency on the one hand, and to keep tabs 
on the election results on the other. The 
worst-case scenario for the palace would 
have been a landslide victory for the PJD, 
which could have enabled the party to 
establish undisputed control over the legis-
lative branch and then challenge the pre-
rogatives of the monarchy on the basis of a 
clear popular mandate. The secular alliance 
failed, however, to perform as expected, 
leading the palace to suspend its support 
for PAM. Yet, some circles in the palace still 
entertain the idea that the party could be 
built up into an alternative to the PJD if the 
current cooperation between the regime 
and the Islamists were to collapse. 
The regime also exploits the Islamist-
secular divide by adopting a neutral and 
passive position when violence between the 
two sides breaks out. For instance, in April 
2014 left-wing students at Fes University 
attacked a roundtable meeting organized 
by the PJD-affiliated organization Al-Tajdid 
al-Tullabi (Student Renewal) that aimed 
to discuss possibilities of rapprochement 
between Islamists and seculars in Morocco, 
leading to the death of a student leader of 
this organization. The far-left wing within 
PAM vociferously defended the attackers, 
placing responsibility on the minister of 
higher education, who happens to be a 
PJD member. Although the regime has 
no qualms about acting with an iron fist 
against radical Islamists, the authorities 
have been slow in responding to such in-
stances of violence by leftists against Islam-
ists. The most plausible explanations for 
such differential treatment are, first, the 
state’s security-oriented approach, which 
focuses on maintaining a balance in which 
Islamists and secular forces keep each other 
in check, and second, to systematically pre-
vent any rapprochement between the two 
camps by consciously exacerbating ideologi-
cal conflicts. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
In Morocco, Islamists and seculars – be they 
moderate or radical – have been prepared 
to make concessions and to form alliances 
with each other based on cost-benefit calcu-
lations rather than ideology. Thus, they are 
not viewing politics as a zero-sum game, 
which has led to much less polarization 
and tension in Morocco than in other coun-
tries of the region. In this context, moderate 
Islamists have scaled back ideology and pro-
ceeded toward moderation while internal-
izing values of tolerance and acceptance of 
others. This tendency should be appreciated 
and enhanced. Both secular and Islamist 
forces need to build trust through frank 
and in-depth dialogue. They also have to 
craft sustainable structures and mecha-
nisms of cooperation that allow them to 
manage ideological differences and focus 
on shared interests. 
A genuine transition toward democracy 
in Morocco will only be successful if all 
relevant political forces are integrated in 
the formal political process, including AWI. 
For this reason, Europeans should encour-
age the palace and the elected government 
to start a genuine dialogue with AWI, allow 
it to create a legal political party, and con-
vince AWI to be part of the formal political 
structure. 
In addition, Europeans should press 
the palace to deepen political reforms that 
would restore confidence in the political 
process by: ceasing to interfere in internal 
party affairs, guaranteeing free and fair 
elections, and replacing the supervision 
of elections by the ministry of the interior 
with a truly independent commission. 
More generally, Europeans should treat 
Islamist parties that comply with demo-
cratic standards as functional equivalents 
to conservative parties in Europe and in-
clude them in international networks of 
conservative political parties, such as the 
International Democrat Union. At the same 
time, they should not accept at face value 
parties that claim “liberal” or “progressive” 
platforms only because they are secular. 
Rather, they should scrutinize their posi-
tions and behavior the same way they 
would Islamists in order to assess the 
practical quality of their commitment 
to democracy. 
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